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Held in Enghien, France, on 24–25 April 2006,
this joint workshop1 brought together researchers
to quantify and better understand differences in
productivity and potential output growth
among industrialized countries. The workshop
was attended by some 30 economists, mainly
from central banks. In this short summary
of the proceedings, the authors highlight the
ﬁndings around the three main themes.
entral banks are keenly interested in produc-
tivity and potential output for a number of
reasons.2  Productivity directly affects ﬁrms’
marginal cost of production, which is a key
driver of prices. Productivity is also a key determinant
of potential output, and short-run deviations of actual
output from potential output, known as the output
gap, are a useful indicator of future inﬂationary pres-
sures. Productivity differentials across countries also
have important implications for the behaviour of the
1. The full text of the conference papers, and some of the discussants’ presen-
tations, are available on the Bank’s website at
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/conference_papers/france2006/papers.html.
2. Productivity is a measure of how efﬁciently an economy transforms its fac-
tors of production (e.g., labour and capital) into goods and services. Potential
output is the level of production compatible with an absence of price pressures
in the goods and labour markets, which is a condition for stable inﬂation.
real exchange rate. Speciﬁcally, economic theory sug-
geststhatifproductivitygainsagainstforeigncountries
are concentrated in the tradable sector then, everything
else being equal, the home country’s real exchange
ratewilltendtoappreciate.Lastly,andmostimportantly,
a nation’s productivity is the prime determinant of its
real incomes and standard of living.
The purpose of the workshop was to bring together
researchers to quantify and better understand differ-
ences in productivity and potential output growth
amongindustrializedcountries.Theresearchpresented
focused on three main themes: (i) estimating potential
output; (ii) productivity and growth; and (iii) institutions,
policies, and growth. Eleven papers were presented;
designated discussants commented on each paper;
and questions were taken from the ﬂoor. Susanto Basu
of Boston College served as rapporteur and gave his
perspective on recent academic research that examines
productivity growth.
This article is a short summary of the proceedings.
Each section begins with an introduction to the issues
and a brief summary of the research presented. Some
additional details are then offered for each paper.
Theme1:EstimatingPotentialGrowth
Thefirstgroupofpapersfocusedonestimatingpotential
output growth (or, alternatively, the output gap) for
several industrialized countries.  Three of the papers
employed statistical techniques to estimate potential
Perspectives on Productivity
and Potential Output Growth
A Summary of the Joint Banque de France/
Bank of Canada Workshop, 24–25 April 2006
Gilbert Cette, Economic Forecasting and Analysis Directorate, Banque de France, and
Don Coletti, International Department, Bank of Canada
C38 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2006–2007
output using a production-function approach, while
the remaining two papers examined potential output
using dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE)
models.
Despite significant measurement problems, some
elements of the analysis seem to be fairly robust. In
particular, the estimates of potential output growth
presented at the workshop suggest sizable differences
between the main industrialized countries. Over the
past decade, for example, it is estimated that the
United States and Canada have experienced potential
output growth in the neighbourhood of three per cent
per year.3 At the other end of the spectrum, Italy and
Japan experienced estimated potential output growth
averaging only about one per cent per year.  The
research also suggests that the substantial differential
in potential growth between countries reﬂects differ-
ences in labour productivity and in the growth of the
labour force.4 For over a decade, the United States, for
example, has been experiencing labour productivity
growth that is high relative to recent historical levels
and much more vigorous than in most other industri-
alized countries. In addition, labour force growth in
Europe and in Japan has fallen behind the pace in
North America.
The work done with the DSGE models also proved to
be quite instructive. One of the lessons learned from
the workshop was that imposing additional restrictions
on data that are generated by a well-specified economic
model can lead to an improvement in estimates of the
output gap.
The first paper in the session, by Tommaso Proietti
(University of Rome) and Alberto Musso (European
Central Bank, ECB), combined a traditional production-
function approach to estimating potential output with
a Phillips curve relationship to estimate and analyze
the euro area’s potential output and its components. A
key finding was that there has been a significant
slowdown in the growth in trend labour productivity
in the euro area, from 3.7 per cent in the 1970s to
2.5 per cent in the 1980s and to 1.9 per cent in the 1990s.
Since 2000, the slowdown has been even more pro-
nounced, with growth in trend labour productivity
estimated to have averaged only 0.7 per cent. In addi-
tion, potential output growth has also suffered, owing
3.  These ﬁgures are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook, various issues.
4.  Labour productivity is deﬁned as output per hour worked.
to the weaker growth in the working-age population.5
These factors have been partially offset by a rise in the
trend labour force participation rate, resulting mostly
from the increased participation of women. On net,
the authors estimate potential output growth at about
1.8percentsince2000.DiscussantMarc-André Gosselin
(Bank of Canada) pointed out that the ﬁndings of the
paper were broadly consistent with research on the
euro area conducted at the Bank of Canada. He added
that the estimated trend seems to track the actual data
too closely, and that, as a result, the authors perhaps
overstate the slowdown in trend labour productivity
and the pickup in trend hours worked since 2000.
Christophe Cahn and Arthur Saint-Guilhem
(Banque de France) estimated potential growth for
several economies: Canada, the euro area, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. A unique feature of
this paper is that total factor productivity (TFP) is ana-
lyzed using econometric techniques and a specification
that relates it to three factors: the capacity utilization
rate, capital-embodied technological improvement6
(which is partly captured by the effect of capital aging),
and a trend in technology.7 The model also allows for
the existence of trend breaks in technological change.
The results suggest that differences in the growth of
labour input, rather than capital input, have played a
crucial role in explaining the lagging growth in Europe
and Japan compared with that of the United States
and Canada. Second, some economies, namely Canada
and the United States, experienced a sharp accelera-
tion in potential output growth in the mid-1990s. For
the United States, this was mainly a result of the accel-
eration in the growth of TFP (+0.5 percentage points),
whereas for Canada, it was attributable to the contri-
bution of labour. Don Coletti (Bank of Canada), in his
discussion, pointed out that the univariate time-series
techniques used by the authors to try to uncover trend
breaks in TFP growth have very low power, particularly
near the end of sample, where they are most relevant
for policy-makers.
5.  Average hours worked per person have declined gradually over the past
three decades. In very recent years, however, the trend level of hours worked
per person has remained, on average, broadly unchanged or has even gradu-
ally increased.
6.  Capital-embodied technological improvement refers to the adoption of
advances in technology through acquisition of capital stock whose design and
construction reﬂects those advances.
7.  In general, growth in TFP represents output growth not accounted for by
growth in capital and labour.39 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2006–2007
Werner Roeger (European Union Commission)
assessed recent potential output growth and produc-
tivity trends in the European Union and the United
States,usingaproduction-functionapproach.Consistent
with the results presented in the previous papers, the
author finds that potential growth is on a downward
trend in the European Union. In particular, for the
euro area, potential growth declined from 2.5 per cent
in the mid-1980s to 1.9 per cent over the 2001–2005
period. This compares to a fairly stable potential growth
trend for the United States of about 3.0 per cent over
the same periods. The author also ﬁnds that potential
output in the European Union is characterized by two
divergent trends; namely, declining growth of TFP that
is not fully compensated by a rising contribution of
labour. His preferred  explanation for the declining
trend in productivity growth centres on the European
Union’s weak performance in terms of the production
of information and communications technology (ICT).
Jean-Paul Fitoussi (Observatoire Français des Con-
jonctures Economiques), in his discussion, pointed out
that these estimates of potential output level and
growth depend only on supply-side variables, which
are considered exogenous. He argued that the deter-
minants of potential output are partly determined by
demand-side variables over the medium and long
term.
Michel Juillard (CEPREMAP8), Ondra Kamenik
(Czech National Bank), Michael Kumhof (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund), and Douglas Laxton (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund) (JKKL) develop and estimate a
DSGE model of the U.S. economy that allows for both
transitory and highly persistent shocks to the growth
rate of TFP. Allowing for the highly persistent shocks
helps the model to generate a positive correlation
between hours worked and output at business cycle
frequencies. JKKL use their model to compute an
extended real-time measure of potential output using
a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter.  As the authors note, it
is well known that univariate filters such as the HP
ﬁlter give very imprecise estimates of the output gap
at the end of the sample.9  JKKL exploit the good fore-
casting performance of their model to construct a two-
sided measure of the output gap. The extended meas-
ure is constructed by treating the model’s forecasts as
additional data that extend the sample period and
8.   CEPREMAP is the Centre Pour la Recherche Economique et ses Applica-
tions in Paris, France.
9.   The HP ﬁlter takes an average of past and future data. At the end of the
sample, it only uses past information.
then using the sample period to estimate potential
output.  To evaluate this extended measure of poten-
tial, JKKL look at the magnitude of the revisions that
would be required as new data become available and
ﬁnd that the extended measure requires less revision,
on average, than the standard measure. On this basis,
they conclude that their extended HP ﬁlter measure is
more reliable. The discussant, Patrick Fève (Banque
de France and Université de Toulouse), pointed out
that it is not surprising that the DSGE model performs
well compared with other economic and statistical
models,sinceitincludesnumerousexogenousstochastic
processes and several non-parsimonious structural
parameters.
Magnus Jonsson, Stefan Laséen, and Karl Walentin
(Sveriges Riksbank) studied the usefulness of four
possible indicators of inﬂation: (i) the trend-adjusted
output gap (i.e., the traditional output gap); (ii) the
flexible-price output gap; (iii) the flexible-price real
interest rate gap; and (iv) real marginal cost of produc-
tion within the context of the Swedish Riksbank’s new
DSGE model (Adolfson et al. 2005).10 The authors ﬁnd
the only “reliable indicator” of inﬂation over history
to be the ﬂexible-price real interest rate gap. Although
it is well known that the real interest rate gap is a good
indicator of inflation in simple New Keynesian models
(see, e.g., Neiss and Nelson 2003), the paper contributes
to the literature by extending this result to a much
larger model with a variety of shocks and frictions.
The discussant, Rhys Mendes (Bank of Canada),
pointed out that, in models of this class, aggregate
demand depends not just on the current real interest
rate, but also on all future rates. Hence, the fact that
the current real interest rate gap has good indicator
properties suggests that monetary policy, over history,
was not fully exploiting the role of expectations. But
policy-makers increasingly view the policy problem
as one of managing expectations so as to inﬂuence the
entire yield curve. Thus, new developments in the
communication and practice of monetary policy may,
over time, weaken the indicator properties of the real
interest rate gap.
10.   The ﬂexible-price output gap is deﬁned as the difference between actual
output and the level of output that would prevail if all prices and wages were
perfectly ﬂexible. Similarly, the ﬂexible-price real interest rate gap is deﬁned
as the difference between the real interest rate and the level of interest rates
that would prevail if all prices and wages were perfectly ﬂexible.40 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2006–2007
investment,” i.e., expenditure on reorganization that
accompanies ICT investment but is not ofﬁcially
measured as investment, could have led to a decline in
the conventional measure of TFP growth. Discussant
Kevin Stiroh remarked that acceleration in TFP and
ICT capital deepening are concentrated in fewer
industries in the United Kingdom than in the United
States, and that this difference across the two coun-
tries is not well understood.
Theme 3: Institutions, Policies, and
Growth
While IT is credited with the acceleration in productivity
that took place in the United States between 1995 and
2002, many other industrialized countries have not
experienced a pickup in productivity growth. By its
nature, the adoption of new technology should be
causing productivity growth to rise in all the industri-
alized countries because IT is not specific to a particular
location and can easily be applied to other economies.
Some researchers have argued that continental
Europe’s relatively weak productivity performance
could be a result of its tax and regulatory framework,
which is thought to stifle competitive forces and hamper
IT diffusion.  Although an abundant literature exists
on the negative effects on economic growth and eco-
nomic welfare implied by structural market rigidities,
empirical evidence that quantifies these effects
remains relatively imprecise. Moreover, these effects
appear to depend on the way reforms are introduced
(sequentially  vs. concurrently) and the market they
affect (labour vs. product).
In previous work, Gust and Marquez (2002) have
investigated the reasons why IT may be more readily
adapted in some economies than in others. The basic
intuition behind their results is that inflexibility in
labourandproductmarketspreventsfirmsfrommaking
the adjustments required to beneﬁt from the new IT.
Christopher Kent, John Simon, and Kathryn Smith
(Reserve Bank of Australia) extend that work using
30 years of cross-country data by asking whether market
flexibility influences TFP growth independently of
whether a country has invested heavily in ICT. The
authors find tentative empirical support for the
hypothesis that lower levels of regulation in product
and labour markets are associated with higher TFP
growth in subsequent years. The authors also find
evidence that labour and product market deregulations
have more effect in combination than separately.  The
discussant, Remy Lecat (Banque de France), high-
lighted some of the difficulties associated with using
Theme 2: Productivity and Growth
The second group of papers used growth accounting
to review historical developments in growth in the
gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States
and the United Kingdom. Growth accounting breaks
down economic growth into components associated
with changes in factor inputs and TFP.
Dale Jorgenson (Harvard University), Mun Ho
(Resources for the Future Inc.), and Kevin Stiroh
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York) analyzed the
sources of U.S. productivity growth through 2004 and
compared the ﬁrst surge in productivity growth after
1995 with the second surge after 2000. The paper ﬁnds
important differences between the two episodes. The
acceleration in productivity growth in the ﬁrst surge
was driven by the production and use of information
technology (IT) equipment and software.  The contri-
bution of both IT total factor productivity and IT capital
deepening accounted for most of the acceleration in
productivity growth. In contrast, these forces played a
much smaller role in explaining the second productivity
surge, which was more heavily influenced by both
non-IT capital deepening and non-IT-related growth
in TFP. The authors project growth for the next decade
in U.S. private sector productivity of 2.6 per cent per
year, close to the 1995–2000 average, but a substantial
decline from the torrid pace of 2000–2004. The authors
emphasize the substantial range of uncertainty by
presenting an optimistic projection of productivity of
3.2 per cent per year and a pessimistic projection of
only 1.4 per cent. The discussant, Nicholas Oulton
(London School of Economics), pointed out that impos-
ing a constant capital-output ratio in the medium-to-
long run helps to reduce the uncertainty around the
base-case projection.
Nicholas Oulton and Sylaja Srinivasan (Bank of
England) used a new industry-level data set to quantify
the roles of structural change and information and
communication technology (ICT) in explaining pro-
ductivity growth in the United Kingdom over the
1970–2000 period. The authors ﬁnd that, despite being
only a small fraction of the total capital stock, ICT-
related capital deepening accounted for 47 per cent
of productivity growth in the market sector over the
1995–2000 period, up from 15 per cent over the 1990–95
period and from 22.5 percent over the 1970–2000 period.
Supplementary econometric evidence also supports
an important role for ICT-related capital deepening.
On the other hand, the authors ﬁnd that TFP growth
slowed between 1995 and 2000. The authors also show
econometric evidence that a boom in “complementary41 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2006–2007
the common indicators of the labour and product mar-
ket regulations in this sort of analysis.
Andrea Bassanini (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, OECD) and Romain
Duval (OECD) presented an extensive study of the
impact of structural policies and institutions on
aggregate unemployment and employment rates
across countries belonging to the OECD. Their analy-
sis was based on cross-country/time-series econometric
estimates of reduced-form models of unemployment
and labour force participation rates. Some main ﬁnd-
ings are that the effects of macroeconomic shocks on
unemployment appear to be ampliﬁed by high unem-
ployment beneﬁts and dampened by highly central-
ized or coordinated wage-bargaining systems. More
tentatively, high rates of home ownership—which are
oftenassociated with low degrees of labour mobility
across regions— increase the impact of shocks on
unemployment, while public spending on active
labour market policies (e.g., labour market training)
reduces it. Policies and institutions affect employment
through their impact on aggregate unemployment and
also through their effects on labour market participa-
tion, particularly for those groups “at the margin”
of the labour market. The paper also shows that a
package of reforms sharing specific objectives will
have a bigger effect than will a group of separate
reforms. The discussant, Gilbert Cette (Banque de
France), pointed out that, even if the results appear to
bear out certain conclusions, they should be treated with
caution because of simultaneity biases that could
amplify some estimated results.
Danny Leung, Césaire Meh, and Yasuo Terajima
(Bank of Canada) attempt to explain part of the differ-
ence in aggregate TFP between Canada and the
United States by focusing on the relationship between
the rate at which a firm adopts new technology and
aggregate productivity in the presence of financial
constraints. In their paper, they develop a dynamic
general-equilibrium (DGE) model in which firms
adopt technology endogenously and display dynamics
(i.e., entry, growth, and exit) that are affected by financial
marketimperfectionsandtaxation.Theauthorsconsider
the implications of the differences between Canada
and the United States in several determinants of tech-
nology adoption and firm size, such as financial market
imperfections, the cost of adopting a technology, and
the tax structures on aggregate TFP. They argue that a
sizable part of the TFP gap between the two countries
is a result of the difference in the economic environment
that distorts a ﬁrm’s technology-adoption behaviour.
The discussant, Jacques Mairesse, National Institute
of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE); Center for
Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST); and
National Bureau of  Economic Research (NBER),
pointed out that the relation between firm size and
productivity level and growth is a difficult question
that should be more explicitly treated in the paper.
Aaron Drew (Reserve Bank of New Zealand), Max
Dupuy (New Zealand Treasury), Richard Downing
(New Zealand Treasury), and Özer Karagedikli
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand) reviewed the recent
literature on New Zealand’s labour productivity per-
formance and offered empirical evidence that suggests
there is scope for higher labour productivity growth
in the future. The authors show that, although labour
productivity growth in New Zealand improved to
1.1 per cent per year over the 1993–2005 period, it
remained below the OECD average. They examine
several possible reasons for the weakness in measured
labour productivity growth, including measurement
issues, the quality of policies and institutions, geogra-
phy and scale, impediments to capital accumulation,
and labour-absorption dynamics. The authors demon-
strate that the entrance of less-qualified workers
into the labour force held back productivity growth
in the order of 0.5 percentage points per year, which
is equivalent to the difference between New Zealand’s
recent growth rates in labour productivity and those
of upper-income OECD countries. The paper also
presents estimates of trend labour productivity from a
multivariate Kalman filter. The uncertainty bands
around the estimates of trend productivity encom-
pass the growth rates of labour productivity of
upper-income OECD countries. Given their empirical
evidence and the findings in the existing literature, the
authors feel there is room for labour productivity to
improve as labour market deepening runs its course.
Discussant Gérard Belet (Ministry of Finance, Gov-
ernment of France) pointed out that New Zealand’s
low rate of productivity growth seems to have the
same cause as that of continental European countries:
the increasing share of less-qualified people in
employment, which is a result of immigration to
New Zealand and of labour market policies designed
to reduce unemployment among less-skilled people in
Europe.
Rapporteur
Susanto Basu (Boston College and NBER) gave his
perspective on recent academic research that examines
productivity growth and offered some interesting sug-42 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2006–2007
gestions for future research. His presentation covered
three key areas: i) interpreting the past: What happened
in the U.S.? ii) predicting the future: What tools should
weuse?andiii)pastandfuture:What(hasn’t)happened
in Europe?
In his presentation, Basu challenged the conventional
view of information and communication technology
(ICT) as the story to explain the acceleration in U.S.
productivity growth since 1995. He argues that much
of the acceleration is an increase in TFP outside of the
production of ICT (Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro 2001).
Although ICT should—and does—show up in labour
productivity growth in ICT-using industries, there is
no reason why that should be the case for TFP in ICT-
using industries. Basu concludes that, if the rise in
TFP in ICT-using industries was caused by ICT, then
it occurred through a channel that is not well under-
stood.11 He then suggested that studying the economic
history associated with the advent of other great
inventions like the telegraph or railroads may be able
to help us improve our understanding of the processes
at work.
Basu reviewed the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of the main tools available to economists for
predicting the future: i) growth accounting combined
with extrapolative techniques; ii) single- or multi-vari-
able statistical models and predictions based on
estimated stochastic processes; and iii) full economic
models applied to the data. The key advantage associ-
ated with accounting-plus-extrapolation is that the
exercise is very transparent. On the downside, we can-
not assess the underlying uncertainty around these
11.   The intuition here is that changes in factor prices don’t shift production
functions.
forecasts as well as can be done with the statistical
approach. Both the growth accounting and statistical
approaches, however, try to forecast the future from
the recent behaviour of a few aggregate series. Since
the historical productivity data for the U.S. contain
only two trend breaks, this raises the issue of how the
effects of something novel can be forecast. Alternatively,
he argues that it might be advantageous to apply more
well-developed economic models. Using an economic
theorylikethepersonal-incomehypothesis,forexample,
can help us to infer what economic agents are thinking
about the expected persistence of a change in TFP.
Cochrane (1994) tells us that a large jump in consump-
tion implies a large expected future increase in income,
which in turn suggests to us that economic agents
expect the increase in TFP that we observe to be quite
persistent. Basu then described other examples of how
economic theory could be used to inform our analysis,
based on more recent and sophisticated papers by
Ireland and Schuh (2006); Edge, Laubach, and
Williams (2003); and Guerrieri, Henderson, and
Kim (2005).
Finally, Basu discussed the European question and
challenged the conventional pessimistic story that reg-
ulations and distortions in European economies have
prevented the euro area from taking full advantage of
new technological opportunities. He questioned how
this story could be true in light of the rapid catch up of
both Europe and Japan after World War II and the nat-
ural advantages to being “followers.”
This summary will also be published in the
February 2007 issue of Le Bulletin de la
Banque de France. Slight differences in the
text represent the style of the two journals.
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